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• We provide a conservative, ‘worst-case’ scenario for the 
impacts on profitability of a suddenly-implemented four 
day week in the private sector.
• We find that a four day week with no loss of pay would 
be affordable for most firms once the initial phase of the 
Covid-19 crisis has passed. 
• However, some firms in some industries would experience 
cashflow problems if changes were implemented too 
quickly.
• A four day week with no loss of pay will most likely be 
implemented in the public sector before the private 
sector.
• Public sector organisations could influence private 
sector businesses through procurement policy and other 
indirect routes.
• The process of changing expectations and behavioural 
norms could be sped up by the creation of more bank 
holidays, and the reintroduction of pro-union legislation. 
Even if a four day week in the private sector took longer 
than expected, a four day week in the public sector 




The Covid-19 crisis has seen unprecedented falls in economic 
activity. Across Europe, in which furlough and short-time work 
schemes were the norm, total hours worked have dropped 
precipitously. In the UK, which had a relatively generous furlough 
scheme, total weekly hours fell by around 18% in the first half of 
2020 (ONS, 2020a). In the USA, in which federal labour market 
support was less generous, the unemployment rate rose to 13% in 
May – but even this might be an underestimate (BLS, 2020).
Alongside the collapse in demand for labour, many more people 
are now working from home. An upshot of this, at least for office-
based work, is that managers are realising that more flexible work 
patterns are not only possible, but can be beneficial for wellbeing 
and productivity (Ralph et al., 2020). This effect of the crisis, which 
in many ways is a positive development, has followed longstanding 
demands for lower and more flexible work-hours.
Autonomy has long argued that a shorter working week ought to 
be implemented as way of achieving greater work-life balance, 
improving mental health, and facilitating a greener and healthier 
society. In this discussion paper, we argue that:
1. A four day week with no loss of pay would be affordable 
for most firms once the initial phase of the Covid-19 crisis 
has passed. However, some firms in some industries would 
experience cashflow problems if changes were implemented 
too quickly.
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2. Historically, most reductions in work-time in Britain have been 
achieved by the campaigning and bargaining activities of 
trade unions. This reflects the fact that average working hours 
are contested between employers and employees, with the 
results of these contests shaping social norms and expectations.
3. As the public sector is the most unionised part of the British 
economy, (point 2) suggests that a four day week with no 
loss of pay will most likely be implemented in the public 
sector before the private sector. Public sector organisations 
could influence private sector businesses through procurement 
policy and other indirect routes, which would ideally result in 
widespread changes in expected hours of work in the private 
sector, and result in sustainable changes consistent with 
business profitability.
4. The process of changing expectations and behavioural norms 
could be sped up by the creation of more bank holidays, and 
the reintroduction of pro-union legislation. Even if a four day 
week in the private sector took longer than expected, a four 
day week in the public sector could support the UK’s long-term 
recovery from the Covid-19 crisis.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we utilise profitability 
data on UK businesses to argue that the implementation of a four 
day week with no loss of pay would be affordable for most firms. 
However, we also find that some firms in some industries are likely 
to suffer from cashflow issues if a four day week was implemented 
too quickly. In section 3, we argue that a four day week with no loss 
of pay will most likely be implemented in the public sector before 
the private sector, and consider the ways in which a four day week 
in the public sector could be used to shape expectations and social 
norms in the private sector, in a manner consistent with private 
sector profitability. In section 4, we consider how a four day week 
in the public sector could be used to support Britain’s recovery 
from the Covid-19 crisis, and we summarise our arguments and 
conclusions in section 5.
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Is a four day week affordable 
for the British private sector?
The most important point that can be made when considering the 
affordability of any labour market regulation is that, on a variety 
of measures, the average British company is highly profitable. Prior 
to the outbreak of the Covid-19 crisis, for example, the net rate of 
return for private non-financial corporations in the UK was above 
9% (ONS, 2020b). This corresponded to an overall profit share in 
the economy of over 40%. British firms are, therefore, generating 
significant amounts of money for their owners.
In this section we examine the profitability of UK firms in more 
detail. Specifically, in order to gauge the affordability of a 
four day week with no loss of pay for private sector firms, we 
compute interval estimates for average profitability following the 
implementation of a four day week. This relies on the estimation 
of a plausible worst-case scenario, which defines the lower limits to 
our estimated intervals, using profitability statistics drawn from the 
Fame database (Bureau van Dijk). Our worst-case scenario relies 
on the following assumptions:
1. Business revenue is proportional to hours worked. As a result, 
if hours worked fall by 20% following the implementation of a 
four day week, then revenue also falls by 20%.
2. Business non-labour costs are also proportional to hours 
worked. So, if hours worked fall by 20%, non-labour costs also 
fall by 20%.
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Effectively, therefore, the worst-case scenario assumes that there 
are no beneficial effects to productivity resulting from a four day 
week, and firms are unable to raise prices. We use earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortization as our measure of 
profitability, which takes headline earnings – i.e. revenue less costs 
– and adds back in interest costs, tax liability, and any allowances 
for depreciation and amortization. As it excludes most costs of 
capital and tax liabilities, EBITDA is a useful proxy for cash flow. In 
addition, the exclusion of capital costs means that most short-run 
fixed costs are excluded, which justifies assumption (point 2) above. 
The EBITDA rate – i.e. EBITDA as a % of revenue – can be written 
as,
where π denotes the EBITDA rate,   denotes revenue,     denotes 
labour costs, and      denotes other costs excluding interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization.  Given our two assumptions, 
the counterfactual worst-case EBITDA rate following the 
implementation of a four day week is,
where variables with a prime (e.g., π’) are variables that change 
after the implementation of a four day week. Note that labour 
costs are assumed to remain unchanged. 
As revenue and non-labour costs are both assumed to fall by 20% 





In other words, a business’s EBITDA rate falls by 25% of its labour 
share (in percentage points) following the implementation of a four 
day week under a plausible worst-case scenario. 
To compute our estimates, we use data drawn from the Fame 
database (Bureau van Dijk). This contains information on the 
financial records of millions of British companies, mainly drawn 
from Companies House. We use cross-sectional data from the most 
recently filed accounts, and limit the analysis to firms with 50 or 
more employees. This is the population of firms most likely to be 
affected by any four day week policy, and is also the population 
most likely to be captured in Fame. We drop any inactive firms, 
firms that do not primarily employ people for profit, and firms 
with no region or industry information. After this process, our final 
sample contains information on just under 54,000 firms, around 
38,000 of which have information on profitability.
Figure 1: Estimated intervals for average profitability by industry. Square markers 
indicate worst-case scenarios, circular markers indicate best-case scenarios.
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Using these data, we can compute worst-case scenario EBITDA 
rates for every firm using the method outlined above. For the 
best-case scenario we simply assume that the reduction in hours 
is entirely offset by increases in productivity and price increases, 
such that the best-case scenario reflects no negative deviations 
in profitability from current reported levels. In fact, there are a 
number of studies suggesting that productivity gains can offset 
a large part of any reductions in profitability following the 
implementation of a four day week, with one study finding that 
two thirds of UK businesses moving to a four day week enjoyed 
improvements in productivity as a result (Henley Business School, 
2019).
Figure 1 plots estimated intervals for average profitability by 
industry, using the method outlined above. In the figure, each 
industry labelled on the vertical axis has an estimated profitability 
interval represented by a horizontal blue line.  The leftmost extent 
of the interval is indicated by a square marker, which is the worst-
case scenario, and the rightmost extent is indicated by a circular 
marker, which is the best-case scenario. The corresponding EBITDA 
rates can be read on the horizontal axis. So, for example, the 
Transportation and Storage industry has a worst-case EBITDA rate 
of just under 2%, and a best-case rate of just over 9%.
Figure 1 indicates that the average firm in most industries should 
remain profitable following the implementation of a four day week, 
but there are five industries in which the estimated EBITDA interval 
includes zero. These are the information and communication, 
administrative and support services, public administration and 
defence, education, and human health and social work industries. 
These are all industries with relatively high labour costs, many of 
which perform public service activities, and which are well known to 
run on tight margins.  It is possible, therefore, that the average firm 
in these industries would struggle to remain in business if a four 
day week was implemented too quickly. 
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Figure 2 plots estimated ranges of average profitability computed 
in the same manner, but now split by region rather than industry. 
Average EBITDA rates are expected to remain positive in every 
region in the United Kingdom, even in the worst-case scenario. 
The variation between regions is considerably lower than the 
variation between industries, and this also appears to be the case 
when we examine profit rates tabulated by industry and region 
simultaneously. 
The region and industry averages in figures 1 and 2 hide a 
large amount of variation in firm-level profit rates, with a large 
proportion of firms in every industry posting negative earnings in 
any given year. This is illustrated in figure 3, which plots histograms 
of the best-case and worst-case EBITDA rates for the entire sample 
of firms. Even in the best-case scenario – in which firms earn the 
same EBITDA rate as they are observed to earn in the data – 
there are always a proportion of firms posting negative profits in 
any year, and this does not necessarily indicate that these firms 
Figure 2: Estimated intervals for average profitability by region. Square markers 
indicate worst-case scenarios, circular markers indicate best-case scenarios.















are at risk of bankruptcy. However, the proportion of firms posting 
negative profits increases in the worst-case scenario, in which 
productivity improvements and/or price increases do not offset the 
reduction in revenue resulting from a four day week.
Finally, it is worth returning to the ‘big picture’ implied by the 
profitability algebra above: firms with significant labour costs will 
find reduced working hours without loss of pay difficult to achieve, 
while firms with lower labour costs will find the same policies 
easier to implement. Figure 4 plots a frequency histogram of the 
most straightforward indicator of the importance of labour costs 
for medium-to-large firms in the UK: wages and salaries as a 
percentage of revenue. 
Figure 3: Frequency histograms of best-case (blue) and worst-case (red) EBITDA 
rates following implementation of a four day week, using the whole sample.





















As the graph suggests, direct labour costs account for less 
than half of turnover for the majority of firms with 50 or more 
employees. There is, however, a ‘long tail’ of firms in which labour 
costs are very high relative to revenue, a lot of which operate 
in the problematic industries discussed above. Again, therefore, 
average firms in most industries should remain profitable following 
the implementation of a four day week, but some firms in some 
industries might struggle if changes were implemented very rapidly.
Two main conclusions can be drawn from this exercise:
1. A four day week with no loss of pay would be affordable for 
most firms once the initial phase of the Covid-19 crisis has 
passed.
2. Some firms in some industries could experience cashflow 
problems if a four day week was implemented too quickly.
This suggests that a four day working week in the United Kingdom 
is a feasible goal, but that any policy push towards a four day 
week will have to be carefully designed. We discuss the means by 
which a four day week could be achieved in the next section.
Figure 4: Frequency histogram of wages and salaries over revenue, using the whole 
sample.
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Implementing a four day week
Since the high point of the industrial revolution, average hours 
of work have reduced steadily in most countries. In the United 
Kingdom, government legislation has not been the main driver 
of these reductions, although various acts of parliament in the 
nineteenth century limited legal working hours for women and 
children (McCormick, 1959). Instead, trade unions have historically 
negotiated working time reductions in Britain, alongside the 
occasional unilateral reduction in hours by enlightened employers. 
The substantial fall in average work-hours after the First 
World War, for example, was initiated by the engineering and 
shipbuilders’ unions, and later spread to metal working trades, 
railways, textiles, coal mining and the construction trades. The 
resulting drop in average weekly hours is immediately visible in the 
long run series charted in figure 5.
Figure 5: Average weekly hours worked, Britain/UK, Bank of England ‘Millennium of 
Macroeconomic Data’ (Thomas et al., 2010).






















Trade unions have also been central to reductions in work-hours 
in other European countries, with Germany being a well-known 
example (Bosch, 1990). Other countries have taken economy-wide 
legislative approaches, sometimes as a response to stalled union 
negotiations. An important example of this approach is the French 
35 hour week legislation, which was introduced between 1998 and 
2002 by the Socialist Party and set a legal limit to the private 
sector working week of 35 hours. As discussed in Askenazy (2013), 
however, the absence of an effective union presence at the firm-
level in France made firm-level negotiations over the specifics of 
work-time reductions very difficult, and led to a highly complicated 
set of regulations. What exactly constituted normal hours of work 
was contested, a variety of minimum wages were created as a by-
product of the legislation, and the public sector was not covered. 
Although the regulations did lead to a reduction in work-hours for 
a large number of employees, they also appear to have increased 
inequalities along the lines of socio-economic status, occupation 
and age, and were progressively dismantled after the Socialists lost 
power in 2002.
The importance of trade unions, and the apparent difficulties 
of designing economy-wide legislation, present a conundrum for 
countries with low levels of unionisation like the United Kingdom. 
Robert Skidelsky, in his 2019 Progressive Economy Forum report 
to the (then) Shadow Chancellor, is apparently pessimistic that 
unions can play any role in twenty-first century Britain, and argues 
that, “Capping working hours nationwide, on the lines of France’s 
35-hour working week, is not realistic or even desirable” (Skidelsky, 
2019, pp.42). Instead, he argues that the state ought to become 
the ‘employer of last resort’ via the creation of a ‘job guarantee 
program’, which could be used as a lever to push down the average 
number of hours worked in the economy (ibid., pp.45).  Quite aside 
from the well-known issues surrounding job guarantee programs 
(Sawyer, 2003), we feel that Skidelsky’s conclusions are overly 
pessimistic.
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While the United Kingdom does suffer from very low unionisation 
rates in the private sector, its public sector is highly unionised. 
As of 2019, over half of public sector employees were unionised, 
compared to around 13% of private sector employees (ONS, 
2020c). This suggests that the implementation of a four day week 
in the United Kingdom could start in the public sector, and would 
most likely be led by the public sector unions. A push towards 
a shorter working week in the public sector would require a 
sympathetic government, but the current Conservative government 
has shown itself to be somewhat more flexible on policy issues than 
its predecessors. Alternatively, pilot schemes could be conducted 
by political sympathetic councils, regional mayors, or devolved 
governments. For costings relating to a four day week in the 
Scottish public sector see Calvert Jump and Stronge (2020). The 
Scottish National Party has shown support for exploring such an 
idea in recent times (Marlborough, 2020). Importantly, as public 
sector pay has fallen substantially in real terms since 2010, there 
is a natural justice argument for significantly reduced work-hours 
across the sector. 
Aside from the practical advantages of negotiating work-time 
reductions in the most unionised sector of the British economy, the 
major benefit of implementing a four day week in the public sector 
is in its role as l’état exemplaire, i.e., its role as an example of best 
practice for the private sector.  As well as implementing a four day 
week for its own workers, for example, public sector procurement 
policy could give preference to firms that have also implemented a 
four day week. We discuss this further in Jones et al. (2020), where 
we discuss the examples of British government contracting being 
used to provide work for disabled ex-servicemen after the First 
World War, and  more recently the requirement for all Scottish 
contracting authorities to consider community benefit requirements 
for any contract worth £4 million or more. Most importantly, we 
also show in that paper that a four day week is affordable for the 
public sector, costing somewhere in the region of £9 billion per 
year.
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A strategy in which working time reductions are initially 
implemented in a large, influential part of the economy reflects the 
basic observation that normal hours of work are essentially a social 
norm; they are collectively determined by precedent and sentiment 
on the one hand, and contested by employers and organised 
labour on the other. For example, Sunday has traditionally been 
the day of rest in Britain, for obvious religious regions, and this 
‘fact’ has rarely been contested. ‘Keeping Saint Monday’, the 
practice of worker absenteeism following festivities on Sundays, 
was relatively common behaviour in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, but was contested in a way that Sunday leisure was not.  
‘Saint Monday’ eventually vanished as a behavioural norm, in part 
because of the establishment of half-days on Saturdays in the 
second half of the century. Reid (1976) describes how half-days on 
Saturdays were consciously encouraged by employers as a means 
of securing a full day of work on Mondays, with an element of 
coercion present. He quotes a Birmingham employer as describing 
how,
Formerly the workpeople were apt to come in at all times, 
but the half-holiday enables me still more strongly to insist on 
regularity, and say, ‘No, you have had your Saturday, and must 
be regular now (Reid, 1976, pp.89).
Thus, the two day weekend was born as a way of increasing weekly 
hours of work. 100 years of trade union action and government 
legislation followed, leading to today’s expectation of a 40 hour 
full-time week with Saturdays and Sundays off.
The implication of these observations is that any four day week 
policy should, ultimately, be about the establishment of new social 
norms. This is something that sustained trade union action has 
historically been successful at achieving. By far the most unionised 
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part of the British economy is the public sector, and therefore this is 
where a four day week is most likely to be achieved in a sustainable 
manner. ‘Big push’ legislation, following the example of France’s 35 
hour week, is apparently less likely to result in sustainable change, 
and in any case we have already demonstrated in section 2 that 
some businesses in some industries would struggle if a four day 
week was implemented too quickly.
A bank holiday route to the four day week
How might the process of change be speeded up, without forcing 
firms into bankruptcy? One simple possibility is an expansion of 
the number of bank holidays. An immediate move to the ‘May 
model’ of two bank holidays per month in June, July, August 
and September would require seven additional public holidays, 
bringing the total number of public holidays in the UK to 15.  An 
additional two public holidays in April (in addition to the Easter 
bank holidays) would bring the total number of public holidays to 
17, still behind countries like India and Cambodia which both have 
18 public holidays per year. As well as increasing the number of 
days off during the school holidays, this would also free up more 
statutory holiday entitlement to be taken over the winter months, 
as the majority of statutory holiday days are currently taken in the 
Spring and Summer months. 
As well as being a simple, ‘gradualist’ option for the private sector 
which could reinforce any actions taken by the public sector, an 
important benefit of the ‘public holiday model’ is engagement with 
the public. Linking new bank holidays to specific events in national 
history or religions, or specific people, could be very popular and 
reinforce a general approach of creating new social norms for 
shorter working hours. Bank holidays could be timed to coincide 
with celebrations in religions other than Christianity, and referenda 
could be held on events and people to celebrate. This could result 
in highly popular holidays akin to Martin Luther King Jr. Day or 
Independence Day in the USA.
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Strengthening worker voice
Perhaps the most obvious way of speeding up the process of 
achieving shorter working hours is by the reintroduction of pro-
union legislation, thus encouraging greater unionisation in the 
private sector. The power of unions to conduct industrial action 
has been repeatedly, and significantly, curbed since the end of the 
1970s, with no fewer than 13 major pieces of legislation enacted 
between the first Thatcher administration and the last Blair/Brown 
administration (House of Commons Library, 2017). Secondary 
strike action and political strikes became effectively impossible, 
as did closed shops, and rules on strike ballots were repeatedly 
tightened. Further restrictions were imposed in the Trade Union 
Act 2016, including a 50% turnout threshold for strike ballots, and 
stringent majority requirements were introduced for workers in 
certain public services. A root-and-branch reform of this legislative 
apparatus would be the most straightforward method to improve 
the lives of workers, including reduced work-hours and other 
improvements in work-life balance.  
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The Covid-19 crisis
The analysis in section 2 is predicated on ‘normal’ profit 
distributions, as the data correspond to accounts filed prior to the 
Covid-19 crisis.  At the time of writing, many more firms are likely 
to be facing negative cashflow, and reduced working hours have 
only been made possible by extensive government subsidisation. 
This, however, makes the strategy outlined in section 3 much more 
pressing, as the rise in employment implied by a four day week in 
the public sector could be used to mitigate the effects of private 
sector job losses over the Winter.
In Jones et al. (2020), we argue that a four day week in the 
public sector could create between 300,000 and 500,000 full-
time equivalent jobs in the sector.  A reasonable multiplier effect 
operating on that number might be expected to cushion the fall 
in aggregate demand, and reduce the number of private sector 
redundancies expected in the coming months. Moreover, these new 
public sector jobs would disproportionately benefit places that have 
been heavily affected by the Covid-19 crisis, including Wales and 
the North East of England, and several parts of the North West, 
as the public sector is an important provider of jobs in these parts 
of Britain.
As the economy recovers from the crisis, and profitability returns 
to normal for most firms, we would expect the public sector’s 
lead in shorter working hours to filter through to private sector 
employee expectations of ‘normal’ work-time, as outlined above. 
Working patterns have already changed dramatically as a result 
of the crisis, and this coincides with a private sector ready to 
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embrace change. A survey undertaken by Survation on behalf of 
Autonomy, for example, found that 47% of business leaders were 
‘very open’, and a further 32% ‘quite open’, to a four day working 
week in which wage bills would increase (Autonomy, 2020). The 
ground has therefore been prepared for widespread changes in 
social norms surrounding working time and work-life balance in 
Britain, and national policy could build on this to achieve material 
improvements in work-life balance after the Covid-19 crisis.
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Summary
In this discussion paper, we have argued that the implementation 
of a four day week with no loss of pay would be affordable for 
most firms in the United Kingdom. Specifically, using data drawn 
from the Fame database (Bureau van Dijk), we compute a range 
of profitability measures that we might expect to observe following 
the implementation of a four day week. Most firms in most 
industries could implement such a policy, which would effectively 
result in a significant increase in hourly wages. However, our results 
also suggest that some firms in some industries would suffer from 
cashflow issues if a four day week was implemented too quickly. 
Trade unions have historically negotiated working time reductions 
in Britain. As the public sector is by far the most unionised sector 
of the British economy, we would therefore expect a four day week 
to be introduced in the public sector before the private sector. A 
strategy in which working time reductions are initially implemented 
in the public sector reflects the basic observation that normal hours 
of work are essentially a social norm. We would expect a four day 
week in the public sector to shape norms and expectations for 
working hours in the private sector, which could work in conjunction 
with trailblazing private sector firms to reduce working hours 
across the economy as a whole. Policies to reinforce this mechanism 
include a repeal of anti-union legislation, and an increase in the 
number of public holidays.
The analysis in this paper is predicated on ‘normal’ profit 
distributions, as the data we use pre-date the Covid-19 crisis. 
However, working patterns for those remaining in ‘nine-to-five’ 
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jobs have changed dramatically as a result of the crisis, and this 
coincides with a private sector ready to embrace change. A survey 
undertaken by Survation on behalf of Autonomy, for example, 
found that 79% of business leaders were either ‘very open’ or ‘quite 
open’ to a four day working week. This confluence of economic 
crisis, widespread job losses, and a private sector ready to embrace 
change make the introduction a four day week a huge opportunity. 
More jobs would be created, more people would enjoy a balance 
between work and leisure, and livelihoods would be protected. We 
argue, in summary, that a four day week with no loss of pay should 
play a central role in post-Covid economic and social policy.
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Notes on data source
The Fame database takes the majority of its data from Companies 
House, and includes information on millions of incorporated and 
unincorporated businesses in the UK and Ireland, both active and 
non-active. It includes information on firm size, location, financial 
information, and a variety of data on shareholders, directors, M&A 
activity and so on. We would like to thank Ayesha Kataria at 
Bureau van Dijk for her help and database advice.
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